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JOHN MARSHALL AND ALEXANDER HAIILTON, ARCHITCrTS OF THE
AMERICAN CoNsTrrUTION. By Samuel J. Konefsky.0 New York: The
Macmillan Co., 1964. Pp. viii, 274. $5.95.
This book, rehearsing conflicts between federal and state power in
the first half-century of our constitutional history, is timely. For the
issue of civil rights, especially of Negroes, takes us back to the need
for what Professor Konefsky phrases as "authority in the central gov-
ernment to curb the parochial and disruptive actions of the states
and to compel them to accept measures required for the good of the
nation as a whole." Thus the national insistence of Marshall and
Hamilton, relived in these pages, applies precisely to reports in today's
newspaper. Back in 1832, when Nullification was the threat, Marshall
wrote from Richmond to Joseph Story of his fears for the Constitution:
"I had supposed that north of the Potomac a firm and solid govern-
ment competent to the security of rational liberty might be preserved.
Even that now seems doubtful. The case of the South seems to me to
be desperate. Our opinions are incompatible with a united govern-
ment even among ourselves."' Hamilton at times was driven closer
to despair.
Fortunately, these prime protagonists of national supremacy in
matters concerning the integrity of the country were also prophets.
Current disquiets are less disturbing because of precedents which
Hamilton and Marshall established. Cultural differences, while they
now appear uppermost, were not lacking in the antagonisms of their
era. Cleavage of social custom must yield to the harmonizing mandate
of the fundamental law, just as contests more explicitly political and
economic were composed. Birchers' billboards in the Southwest crying
"Impeach Earl Warren" were anticipated in President Jefferson's
mutterings against John Marshall. Federal officers in western Pennsyl-
vania fared worse, at the hands of Whiskey Boys, than did those dis-
patched to execute court orders in Oxford, Mississippi 175 years later.
By coupling the services of Hamilton and Marshall to the Constitu-
tion, the author presents not only a cordial partnership of statesmen,
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but a development, or continuing articulation of principles, for Hamil-
ton left off as Federalist leader at the moment that Marshall ascended
the bench. From wide and thorough acquaintance, Professor Konefsky
draws familiarly on a mass of materials, selecting episodes and decisions
that illustrate his central theme, the emergence and firming of national
authority. Students of the period will approve his interpretation,
unless partisans of strict construction of the Constitution would wish
more attention to reasons for that view. The author avoids technicali-
ties in favor of a straightforward recital informative to the general
reader.
Gratefully, this volume does not pose Hamilton and Marshall as
conservatives in the easy fashion all too common. A conservative, pre-
sumably, guards accepted sanctions. These men, Marshall even more
than Hamilton, were in a minority laboring to create a pattern for
the conduct of American public life. They were innovators, activists,
anything but keepers of a waning economic, political, and legal phi-
losophy. They were less defenders than promoters. What they cherished
grew by their efforts.
It is further appropriate to treat Hamilton and Marshall together,
for the focus of both was primarily political. The economic contribu-
tions of Hamilton are familiar, and the author cites Professor Dorf-
man's description of the economic foundations of Marshall's legal
opinions. But for both, positive government was the means of achiev-
ing social progress. Here again we are thankful for their light and
leading. Increasingly, as economics becomes less a system of dogmas,
and more a choice of public policies, polity, rather than private ac-
quisitiveness, determines the course of action. The sovereign notion
of these statesmen was that economic behavior is not to be obeyed,
but shaped.
Since this, by invitation of the editors, is a review article, not a
summary notice, and since Professor Konefsky particularly spells out
the impact of Chief Justice Marshall, the participation of the first
Secretary of the Treasury may be further explored.
Hamilton was as firm as anybody, and firmer than most, for inde-
pendence. But he was less seized than others by the freedom frenzy
of the Revolution. If tradition serves, he held the Sons of Liberty in
check at the doors of King's College until he could spirit the Loyalist
President Cooper out the back way in little more than his nightshirt
but without the intended dress of tar and feathers. He deplored the
raid of Isaac Sears and his horsemen on the press of James Rivington.
It was from the place in New Jersey called "Liberty Pole" (now Engle-
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wood), when the war was in parlous state, that he urged on James
Duane the reforms, political and economic, necessary for success in
the struggle. While still in uniform, writing from Washington's head-
quarters, he begged Governor Livingston to be moderate in approv-
ing punishments for suspected Tories.
Following the peace, Hamilton was foremost in pleading that ad-
herents of the British who had remained in New York during the
occupation not be expelled indiscriminately to Nova Scotia, since
their talents and means would help rebuild the economy of the city.
He began his law practice by defending enemy merchants being sued
for trespass, during the conflict, on patriot property. He applauded
the French Revolution only briefly before he saw that the object of
the rights of man was degenerating into grievous excesses. First to
last, he never indulged in flag-waving, but reserved his earnest elo-
quence to recommend solid expedients for creating a viable Union.
Let others linger in the glow of freedom; he busied himself to give
it a basis in fact. He had no political adolescence, but sprang from
childhood into sober manhood.
This does not mean that the romantic was omitted from his nature.
In his youth he indited sentimental verses, interrupted, however, by
appreciation of useful lessons from Machiavelli's Prince. He enjoyed
military exploit, was resentful when chances of battle glory were
denied him during the war, and sought enthusiastically his later ap-
pointment as Inspector General. He had an extra-marital affair which,
if we may judge by the woman's letters (we lack his, if he wrote any)
was fervid. A severely practical man would have turned his back on
dueling. Intellectually and morally Hamilton condemned the practice,
but he engaged as second to John Laurens in the latter's encounter
with General Charles Lee, he threatened interviews on the field of
honor with Commodore Nicholson and James Monroe, and he died
in his duel with Aaron Burr. In these exchanges was more than a touch
of the romantic, unrealistic, and capricious.
Jefferson figures as the philosopher, the explorer in fields of humane
ideas, of natural phenomena (the fauna and flora of Virginia), and of
language. As exponent of democracy, he was Benjamin Franklin with a
dream added. His economic allegiance to individualism, laissez faire,
and agricultural life was a compound of the near-frontier of Monti-
cello and the rebellion of French Physiocrats against the mercantile
system. Correspondingly, in matters of government, he espoused local
option as against national authority.
Hamilton, by contrast, has been pictured as possessing more limited
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vision, focused on ways and means rather than on ideals. His expert-
ness in empirical strategy, especially fiscal, is readily praised. Hamil-
ton's reach in recommendation of long-range social development has
been said to fall short of Jefferson's noble conceptions. So many
imponderables enter into this comparison that it is difficult to come to
a defensible conclusion. An approach to an answer may rely on two
considerations, one of theory and the other of history.
As to theory we are obliged to question the popular notion that
Hamilton was the champion of capitalist enterprise. True, he stood
for the protection of property claims, but every public man of his time,
in America and in Britain, whatever his constitutional slant, did the
same, unless we are to include the virtual anarchism of William
Godwin. Life, liberty, and property were the accepted triumvirate. A
favorite form of property, in slaves, Hamilton consistently condemned.
Perhaps he remembered the abuses of slavery in his native West Indies.
So far as we know, he never owned a slave; he early joined an anti-
slavery society in New York led by his friend John Jay, he ministered
to the welfare of freedom, and he urged the recruitment of slaves in the
Revolutionary army with promise of their liberty with their swords.
It is no purpose of this review to magnify the antagonisms between
Hamilton and Jefferson. That theme has been too much dwelt upon.
On the contrary, it is more revealing to treat each as a proponent
rather than as an opponent. Their services, as must appear, were com-
plementary in constructing American society. But we are not called
upon, on the head of property, to be blind to the fact that Jefferson, the
proclaimer of the rights of man, held many slaves, whom he worked for
his advantage. "The Spirit of Christmas at Monticello" is the title of
a recent holiday brochure which pictures the slaves serving the revels.
The black people had their own merry-making in the quarters, and the
author, Professor Boyd, is candid enough to include an apology for the
shocking contrast between Christianity and chattel slavery, especially
in the household of Jefferson. Custom, the obfuscations of manumis-
sion, and the supposed benefits to the slaves themselves furnish plau-
sible excuses. But these obstacles to freeing slaves all deny principle
which Quakers and other brave souls acted upon.
Defense of property aside, Hamilton had his own economic and
political philosophy. It was that of the power of association or of organ-
ization. He agreed with Adam Smith's stress on division of labor, which
has as its counterpart cooperation of specialists. Adam Smith, for co-
ordination of effort, relied on the mechanism of the competitive
market, whether within a country or between countries. But Hamilton,
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instead of trusting to the chances of self-interest, invoked the wisdom,
policy, and resources of government, both to encourage private initia-
tive and to promote combination of pursuits. He did not depend upon
an invisible hand to accomplish the public good, but supplied purpose-
ful plan. In a new nation, with ample and varied natural endowrments,
but with a sparse population of little skill and capital, he would bring
government to the assistance of commerce, industry, finance, and
agriculture.
Hamilton returned for inspiration to the best aims and methods of
the mercantilists. He had more in common with his predecessors,
Colbert and Mun, than with his successors, Carnegie and J. P. Morgan.
Before the Careys and Friedrich List emphasized the precept, he inter-
posed the nation between the individual and the world of individuals.
His study was to make the nation economically prosperous and politi-
cally disciplined. For Hamilton, dogma yielded to expediency, the
absolute to the relative. In the superficial view, in an age that ap-
plauded laissez faire, he retrogressed to legislative controls. But actually
he laid hold on the advanced idea that what we call wealth, or social
welfare, is not so much in production and exchange of goods and
services, as in the faculty of organization. Political economy is as im-
material and sophisticated as political science. For him, capacity went
beyond the accumulation and application of capital. Rounded progress
of an economy and polity required deliberate plan and execution.
Under such auspices, well-being is cumulative, partaking more of the
geometric than of the arithmetical. Two and two, in such a society,
make more than four.
Does this theory neglect democracy? Here it must be understood that
Hamilton's task, before and after the Constitution, was preparatory.
Sovereignty must rest upon solvency. His solicitude was for the whole
people. In great issues, unmistakably posed, the people could be
trusted to judge rightly. In matters of legislative and administrative
tactics, in interim decisions, they would profit by responsible guidance.
He urged the usefulness of an elite, as servant of the community. To
enlist special abilities it was necessary and proper to reward them with
opportunities of material gain and the satisfaction of exercising author-
ity in the public behalf. This is far different from disparaging de-
mocracy and promoting privilege. Near the end of his career he
regretted that he and his fellow-Federalists, absorbed in devising
national policies and putting them to work, had not sufficiently culti-
vated the confidence of the people. He sincerely projected means of
repairing this defect, but too late. The public could be grateful to the
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Federalists without choosing to follow them in the next act of the
national drama.
On this point of Hamilton's democracy-qualified faith in democ-
racy, if you wish-we must remember that in 1801 when the presidency
hung in the balance in the House of Representatives, Hamilton
exhorted his friends there to prefer Jefferson, whose policies he dis-
liked, to Burr, whose principles he distrusted. The weight of his pleas,
when the issue was delicately poised, may have tipped the scale. Hamil-
ton frankly said that, with assurances from Jefferson on a few cardinal
questions, the future of the country was safe in his hands. This was
Hamilton's noble patriotic surrender.
So much for theory, or for Hamilton's public purpose and outlook.
What has been the unfolding of American history since? The two
views at the outset-collective controls and individualist choice-have
been interwoven threads in the national fabric. At times the one or
the other has been more prominent, from current party dominance or
from more profound social changes. Neither force would have served so
well without the corrections and supplements of the other. But the
tortoise has overtaken the hare. With increased growth and integration
of our society, national responsibility has proved superior to state and
local volition. The evidences, economic, political, and cultural, are
too manifest to require recital. At this moment an administration
which acknowledges Jefferson as its parent pursues a multiplicity of
policies which Hamilton, if he did not inspire them, would doubtless
endorse.
Furthermore, the remainder of the world, in differing degrees, mag-
nifies the role of government in men's daily lives. Western Europe
adopts measures of public planning, Eastern Europe and most of Asia
proceed completely on that principle. The undeveloped countries,
whether coached by communism or by capitalism, expect to make
progress through collective means.
As Professor Konefsky's portrayal of the influence of the two men
abundantly shows, Marshall carried forward Hamilton's purpose to
utilize the central government as the powerful means of promoting
American national progress. Here the Chief Justice had an advantage
over the Secretary of the Treasury. The urgings of a cabinet minister
may be persuasive, and take form in institutions (funding system, Bank
of the United States, and protective tariffs), which prove serviceable.
But he is regarded, at the time and afterward, as the exponent of
policies subject to political reversal. On the other hand, the pro-
nouncements of the highest court are deeply etched on the tablets of
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the law. They may be reinterpreted, even canceled, in later decisions,
but they are not readily washed out in shifts of party domination. Thus
Marshall was able to give an imprimatur to what Hamilton had ear-
nestly commenced.
We are at no loss to understand Hamilton's hopes of the Consritu-
tion and his valiant efforts, in spite of his own misgivings, to use the
Constitution as the instrument for producing national greatness. In
his hands (and that is not too strong an expression) the Constitution
became an enabling act. With a profound deference for the law, he yet
regarded it as living and changing in response to public need. The
Constitution was a means, not a model, certainy not an idol. Only a
slack public official, if a policy-maker, would lean upon the letter of
the law and refuse to discharge his function by responsibly interpreting
its spirit. Devoted as he was to positive government, he used the com-
munity's most precious asset, the common will.
Professor Konefsky agrees with Beveridge and others that Hamilton
was not the source of Marshall's convictions. However, in opening dis-
cussion of McCulloch v. Maryland, our author refers to the Chief
Justice as "a conscious disciple of the Hamiltonian brand of national-
ism." Since this suit arose from Maryland's assertion of state's rights,
Marshall declared impressively that the Constitution was the act, not
of the states, but of the people. Hamilton, in defending to President
Washington the constitutionality of the First Bank, was not called on
to expound the origin of the fundamental law, though his conception
of it was always the same as Marshall's. The remainder of Marshall's
decision in McCulloch v. Maryland is straight out of Hamilton's report,
though the Chief Justice's statement is not as crisp as that of the first
Secretary of the Treasury. Indeed, Hamilton could have derived his
own argument for implied powers of Congress and his treatment of the
"necessary and proper" clause from the copious debate in Congress on
the bill to charter the bank. Hamilton did not need to revert to that
rehearsal, for he had supplied the reasoning of the bank's supporters.
On the general question of Hamilton's influence on Marshall, which
must be in the reader's mind throughout Professor Konefsky's pages,
there is no reason to diminish Marshall's originality. The two men,
moving in the same scenes, early arrived at the same view of the broad
powers of the national government and the emphatic need to use these
powers for the strength and harmony of the Union. Marshall made his
own additions, not only legal but political. An example is Marshall's
clear-cut assertion of the right of review of legislation by the federal
courts, expressed by him in the Virginia ratifying convention five years
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prior to Marbury v. Madison. Hamilton, treating the authority of the
Supreme Court, did not allow the tribunal the same latitude in apply-
ing the Constitution. Hamilton, in pressing through his program, was
not concerned with striking down acts of Congress, but wanted to find
room for them in the wording of the Constitution.
Though Marshall was far from being Hamilton's creature, Hamilton
could not have done better than invent John Marshall to carry on his
work in the next generation against odds. Marshall, in his high judicial
office, was a projection of the purposes of Hamilton. Marshall was a
blessed salvage from the wreck of the Federalist party. Hamilton's
political ineptitude, as party leader, is evident in his failure to train
apprentices. His collaboration was mainly with men of his own age, or
older, who had come independently to the same commitment, such
figures as Washington, Boudinot, Jay, King, Robert and Gouverneur
Morris, Greene, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, and Duane. He early
lost the valuable cooperation of Madison and wantonly alienated John
Adams. Three members of Adams' cabinet may be called Hamilton's
apostles; but he had to supply lacks in the well-meaning McHenry;
Wolcott, Hamilton's proteg6, in later years was a "Toleration Republi-
can"; and the devoted Pickering erred the other way in extreme
Federalism.
Hence the special importance of Marshall as a Federalist carry-over.
Aside from his signal service in giving scope to the Constitution,
Marshall erected the judiciary to majestic stature in spite of obstacles
greater than those Hamilton met in creating the Treasury. Marshall
took the vaguest department of government, little esteemed by Jay and
not improved by Ellsworth, and made it equal and, on occa-
sion, superior to the others. On the other hand, when Hamilton
entered the empty Treasury, all looked anxiously to him to fill it and
furnish sinews for the nation. Marshall immediately encountered the
bitter hostility of Jefferson and held steadily to his course through a
long series of antagonistic executives. Contrariwise, Hamilton rode
the crest of the Federalist wave, enjoyed the perfect support of Wash-
ington during his tenure in the Treasury and afterward, and, unoffi-
cially and gratuitously, managed the finances during most of John
Adams' term.
We say "the beginning is hard," but the next stage of American
development brought complications-political, military, commercial,
and geographic expansionist-even harder to overcome. Hamilton
successfully argued his program through Congress; only his carriage
tax came to the Supreme Court, and here also his plea won a favorable
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verdict. The executive and legislative branches had an inescapable,
almost organic connection. But the Chief Justice was not expected to
be a policy maker, and worked under the handicap of detachment.
A further contrast between the service of Hamilton and of Marshall
to the Constitution presents itself. Marshall approved the Constitution
to an extent not shared by Hamilton. At the Annapolis commercial
talks and long before, Hamilton did more than others to produce the
calling of the Constitutional Convention of 1787. In the convention he
was crippled by the opposition of his two fellow delegates from New
York, Lansing and Yates. However, it was not this frustration that
provoked him to unveil on the floor a plan of union more centralized
than any but a few would accept. When, after a considerable absence,
he returned to the convention, as Washington urged, he was the lone
representative of his state, and thus had no vote. But he had learned
prudence, and recommended a scheme more moderate than his first
essay, and thereafter busied himself to compose differences between
delegates. Though the document, as framed, fell short of his desires, he
begged for its unanimous approval. Then in his Federalist papers he
used anonymity and patriotism to give a better character to the Con-
stitution than he would confess before St. Peter. In the New York
ratifying convention at Poughkeepsie he continued more vehemently
in this strain. In the Treasury and for the remainder of his life he
did his best to prop what he called, perhaps in a moment of despon-
dency, the "frail fabric."
Marshall was a sturdy supporter of the Constitution in the Virginia
convention, but he was not obliged, except briefly as Secretary of State,
to assume administrative responsibility under it. By the time he became
Chief Justice the first ten amendments had satisfied the clamor for a
bill of rights. The Eleventh Amendment had been adopted, ostensibly
limiting the judicial power of the United States, but Marshall con-
strued it to forbid states, as Professor Konefsky says, "to determine for
themselves the extent of the jurisdiction of federal courts." Moreover,
the government was prosperously launched under the Constitution.
If John Adams' enforcement of Alien and Sedition Acts caused outcry,
the same President had removed the threat of war with France. Mar-
shall was to have his grievous troubles, as we have said, before he could
sit on the bench with comfort or even with safety, but at least the
Constitution had been proved during a dozen years and Marshall was at
peace with it.
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